From: owner-ammf-digest@smoe.org (alt.music.moxy-fruvous digest) To: ammf-digest@smoe.org Subject: alt.music.moxy-fruvous digest V14 #15896 Reply-To: ammf@fruvous.com Sender: owner-ammf-digest@smoe.org Errors-To: owner-ammf-digest@smoe.org Precedence: bulk alt.music.moxy-fruvous digest Wednesday, April 16 2025 Volume 14 : Number 15896 Today's Subjects: ----------------- Welcome to Kobalt Tool Set Reward Panel ["Congratulations" Subject: Welcome to Kobalt Tool Set Reward Panel Welcome to Kobalt Tool Set Reward Panel http://mastercard.za.com/D1Nw7W-TPzn3-7f01xRTNP8z2FCzP84X96X6nV4mjgGMwFnv http://mastercard.za.com/M4B1uhEVoKPWchdBNuauZd1YmAN1GnsdEhHiSJMkQQNyo_Xz ossible to establish the conceivability of zombies, so the argument, lacking its first premise, fails. Daniel Dennett argues that "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition". He coined the term "zimboes"bp-zombies that have second-order beliefsbin arguing that p-zombies are incoherent: "Zimboes thinkZ they are conscious, thinkZ they have qualia, thinkZ they suffer painsbthey are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!" In The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies (1995), Dennett compares consciousness to health. Supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination you can remove consciousness while leaving all cognitive systems intactba quite standard but entirely bogus feat of imaginationbis like supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination, you can remove health while leaving all bodily functions and powers intact. b& Health isn't that sort of thing, and neither is consciousness. Michael Lynch argues that the zombie conceivability argument forces us to either question whether we actually have consciousness or accept that zombies are impossible. If zombies falsely believe they are conscious, how can we be sure we are not zombies? We may believe we have conscious mental states when in fact we merely hold a false belief. Lynch thinks denying the possibility of zombies is more reasonable than questioning our own consciousness. Daniel Stoljar has proposed what he calls "the phenome ------------------------------ End of alt.music.moxy-fruvous digest V14 #15896 ***********************************************