From: owner-ammf-digest@smoe.org (alt.music.moxy-fruvous digest) To: ammf-digest@smoe.org Subject: alt.music.moxy-fruvous digest V14 #11543 Reply-To: ammf@fruvous.com Sender: owner-ammf-digest@smoe.org Errors-To: owner-ammf-digest@smoe.org Precedence: bulk alt.music.moxy-fruvous digest Tuesday, June 6 2023 Volume 14 : Number 11543 Today's Subjects: ----------------- Survey Registration Confirmation ["TUMI Department@survivalbackpack.best"] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 14:02:35 +0200 From: "TUMI Department@survivalbackpack.best" Subject: Survey Registration Confirmation Survey Registration Confirmation http://survivalbackpack.best/Xi5MF6SV6rW913Av8FM5PAnhEQ7f2eR1ktwFqtqdFM1uWgeAWA http://survivalbackpack.best/sOfoCWrbM-ww9WAHYMRtNzZBglaZ303sBBBD--fiMYEoFFrwWw Between the world wars the British Army developed a doctrine based on using machinery as a substitute for manpower. In this way, it was hoped that mobility could be restored to the battlefield and the enormous casualties of the Great War could be avoided. The Army embraced motor transport and mechanisation as a means of increasing the tempo of operations. The wholesale mechanisation of the infantry and artillery was ordered in 1934 and by 1938, the British Army had only 5,200 horses, compared with 28,700 in the eve of the Great War in 1914. In the Second World War, the Army relied entirely on motor transport to move supplies between the railheads and the divisional depots. France was occupied by Germany in June 1940 following the German victory in the Battle of France. An important factor in the defeat was the failure of the logistical system of the British Expeditionary Force, which responded too slowly to the rapid German advance. In the aftermath, the prospect of a British army invading and liberating France was remote, and the British Army concentrated on repelling rather than mounting a cross-channel attack. On 19 June 1940, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir John Dill, ordered that all line of communications units not required for home defence be disbanded and no further units be raised. In the event of an invasion of the UK, the Home Forces planned to rely on civilian resources for transportation, communications and maintenance. In March 1941, the War Cabinet decided that the Army had reached its maximum size. Henceforth, although the manpower "ceiling" was to be raised a little, this meant that raising more logistical units required the conversion of other units. By this time, Home Forces divisions had a divisional slice (the personnel of the division plus the supporting operational and logistical units at corps and army level) of 25,000, but overseas operations required ------------------------------ End of alt.music.moxy-fruvous digest V14 #11543 ***********************************************